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Freedom of Religion under the European Convention
on Human Rights: A Precious Asset
Françoise Tulkens*
I would like to begin by saying that I am very grateful to your
prestigious university and its law school, as well as to the
International Center for Law and Religion Studies, for this
invitation. It is an honor and a pleasure to be here with such an
outstanding audience of judges, scholars, lawyers, NGOs, and public
officials from all over the world. Let me also say that I am really
moved by your hospitality and kindness and how grateful I am to all
of you, especially to the volunteer students. Many thanks from the
bottom of my heart.
As the voice coming from Europe and as a modest contribution
to the work of this conference, I shall touch on two issues, which are
of course interrelated. First, how, in the European Convention on
Human Rights, freedom of religion has built itself as a fundamental
human right, and how this right has been interpreted by the case law
of the European Court of Human Rights in the context of our
contemporary society. Secondly, I will address the question of
conflicting rights and the various approaches used by the European
Court of Human Rights to judge them.
As we know, the European Convention on Human Rights was
drafted and adopted on November 4, 1950, in the aftermath of
World War II, and it entered into force in September 1953. It has
just celebrated its sixtieth anniversary. 1 Today, it has been ratified by
forty-seven State Parties, and it has become the fundamental charter
(magna carta) of the “common home Europe.” As far as the key
elements of the Convention are concerned, its preamble is highly
significant. It traces the outlines of a European ordre public. The
rights and freedoms guaranteed by the Convention “are the
* Former Judge and Vice President of the European Court of Human Rights, Professor
emeritus at the University of Louvain (Belgium), and Associate Member of the Académie
Royale de Belgique. This keynote address was given at the Twentieth Annual Law and Religion
Symposium at Brigham Young University on October 6, 2013.
1. Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Nov.
4, 1950, Europ. T.S. No. 5; 213 UNTS 221 [hereinafter ECHR].
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foundation of justice and peace in the world” and are best
maintained “by an effective political democracy.” 2 Democratic
society is the focal point of human rights, the unifying force within a
Europe of human rights in which the Convention acts as a basic law.
Democracy is the central value of European ordre public. It would be
a mistake to see the preamble as merely rhetorical. In interpreting
and applying the Convention, the European Court of Human Rights
relies heavily on these principles not only as a source of inspiration
but also as a basis for its action.
There are three key provisions of the European Convention on
Human Rights that deal with religion. Article 9 provides the basic
framework for freedom of religion. Article 14 ensures that the rights
acknowledged by the Convention should be free from any
discrimination. Article 2 of the First Additional Protocol to the
Convention gives parents the right to regulate the religious
education of their children. If the first and most central is Article 9,
the two others are gaining importance, especially Article 14. 3
As a matter of fact, the “new” European Court of Human Rights
set up in 1998 has received a growing number of applications
concerning freedom of religion. As observed by Clare Ovey and
Robin C.A. White, “[t]his increase in applications is seemingly
attributable to factors such as the expansion of the Council of
Europe eastwards, the contemporary importance of religion on the
global political arena, and the changing religious demography of
Europe.” 4
I. FREEDOM OF RELIGION AS A FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT
A. A Precious Asset
As in many international treaties, Article 9, section 1 of the
European Convention on Human Rights guarantees to everyone
(every person) the right to freedom of thought, conscience and
religion. 5 As Malcolm Evans has pointed out, the idea that freedom
2. Id. at preamble.
3. See ANALYSE COMPARÉE DES DISCRIMINATIONS RELIGIEUSES EN EUROPE [A
COMPARATIVE APPROACH TO RELIGIOUS DISCRIMINATION IN EUROPE] (Elisabeth Lambert
Abdelgawad & Thierry Rambaud eds., 2011).
4. CLARE OVEY & ROBIN C. A. WHITE, THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN
RIGHTS 439 (4th ed. 2006).
5. Carolyn Evans, Religious Freedom in European Human Rights Law: The Search for a
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of religion is for everyone is essential. 6 In a nutshell, this right
includes freedom to change religion and belief either alone or in
community with others and in public or private and also freedom to
manifest one’s religion or belief in worship, teaching, practice and
observance. But only the last one may be subjected under Article 9
section 2 to limitations (interferences) prescribed by law and
necessary in a democratic society in the interests of public safety and
for the protection of public order, health, morals, and the rights and
freedoms of others. 7 As we see, there is a substantial dividing line
between freedom of religion (internal conviction, inner sphere) and
freedom to manifest one’s religion in the public sphere (the
expression of that conviction). Finally, as Renáta Uitz rightly
observes, unlike the case of other civil and political rights, freedom of
religion has an individual as well as a collective aspect. 8 The freedoms
guaranteed are closely related to freedom of expression (Article 10 of
the Convention) and to freedom of association (Article 11) since
many religious and belief systems expect some form of community
worship or association.
Against this background, the Court has been called upon to
address the scope and content of Article 9 in a wide variety of cases,
involving matters as diverse as proselytism, the grant of registration
of religious bodies, the refusal of authorizations for places of
worship, prohibition on the wearing of religious dress or symbols in
public places, and conscientious objection. In its case law the Court
has reiterated the central importance played by religious and
philosophical beliefs in European society.
Before examining some of these elements, let’s get back to the
“fundamentals” (fondamentaux). In 1993, in its first judgment
under Article 9, the Court established the principle: “freedom of

Guiding Conception, in RELIGION AND INTERNATIONAL LAW, 385, 385–86 (Mark W. Janis &
Carolyn Evans eds., 2004). See also MALCOM EVANS, RELIGIOUS, LIBERTY AND
INTERNATIONAL LAW IN EUROPE (2007).
6. Malcom Evans, Advancing Freedom of Religion or Belief: Agendas for Change, 1
OXFORD J. L. RELIG. 5, 6 (2012).
7. Article 9 does not belong to the provisions included in the second paragraph of
Article 15 as non-derogable. On this point the Convention differs from the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, where in Article 4 section 2 the freedom of thought,
conscience, and religion laid down in Article 18 is declared non-derogable. See OVEY &
WHITE, supra note 4, at 441.
8. RENÁTA UITZ, FREEDOM OF RELIGION IN EUROPEAN CONSTITUTIONAL AND
INTERNATIONAL CASE LAW 12 (2007).
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thought, conscience and religion is one of the foundations of a
‘democratic society’ within the meaning of the Convention. It is, in
its religious dimension, one of the most vital elements that go to
make up the identity of believers and their conception of life, but it is
also a precious asset for atheists, agnostics, sceptics and the
unconcerned. The pluralism indissociable from a democratic society,
which has been dearly won over the centuries, depends on it.” 9
Article 9 protects both religious and non-religious beliefs. This
freedom entails, inter alia, the freedom to hold or not to hold
religious beliefs and to practice or not to practice religion.
Pluralism obviously, or implicitly, transcends all the Article 9
jurisprudence. 10 So pluralism, and especially its practical application,
is perceived both with respect to the collective dimension of freedom
of religion and with regard to its individual aspect. As a matter of
fact, the idea of pluralism is found throughout the entire Convention
and constitutes one of its interpretative principles. As stressed in the
Gorzelik and Others v. Poland judgment of February 17, 2004,
“pluralism is also built on the genuine recognition of, and respect
for, diversity and the dynamics of cultural traditions, ethnic and
cultural identities, religious beliefs, artistic, literary and socioeconomic ideas and concepts. The harmonious interaction of persons
and groups with varied identities is essential for achieving social
cohesion.” 11
What does the Court mean by religion and belief? The
protection of Article 9 extends to a wide range of convictions and
philosophies, not limited to religious belief. However, the Court did
not offer a definition of religion or belief; it merely said that not all
opinions or convictions constitute beliefs in the sense protected by
Article 9 section 1. In reality, for the article to apply, a belief must
“attain a certain level of cogency, seriousness, cohesion and
importance,” 12 and also be such as to be compatible with human
dignity and democracy. The same position is held by the United

9. Kokkinakis v. Greece, App. No. 14307/88, 260-A Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) 18, § 31
(Eur. Ct. H.R. 1993).
10. For an enunciation of the primordial importance of religious pluralism as one of the
foundations of a democratic society, see Nolan and K. v. Russia, App. No. 2512/04, § 73
(Eur. Ct. H.R. 2009).
11. Gorzelik and Others v. Poland, App. No. 44158/98, § 92 (Eur. Ct. H.R. 2004).
12. Campbell and Cosans v. United Kingdom, No. 48, 4 Eur. H.R. Rep. (ser. A) 293, ¶
36 (Eur. Ct. H.R. 1982).
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Nations Human Rights Committee under the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. 13 This means that mere ideas
or opinions will not constitute a belief. The line is difficult to draw
since belief is, of course, inherently subjective.
Some may criticize the Court for failing to interpret Article 9 in
such a way as to realize its full potential by not engaging with what is
meant by the word “religion.” But, as observed by Nicolas Bratza, it
is difficult to achieve a definition that is flexible enough to embrace
the immense range of world faiths but, at the same time, precise
enough to be capable of practical application. 14 This wide protection
has enabled the Court to hold the provision to be applicable not
merely to traditional and long-established religions (Hinduism,
Christianity, Islam, Judaïsm, Budhism, Sikkhism), but also to other
forms of religious movements, including Druidism and Scientology,
as well as to a wide range of philosophical beliefs (pacifism, atheism,
etc.). 15 Where there has been controversy as to whether a particular
set of beliefs qualified as a religion, the Court has more recently
taken the cautious view that it is not its task to rule in the abstract on
such matters; in the absence of a European consensus, it stated that
it would look to the domestic system for the nature of
classification. 16 It may not, in any event, be a crucial matter, since
even if not a religion, a suitably conscientious system of beliefs or
thoughts could still fall under Article 9.
B. Individual Aspect
The internal dimension, the forum internum, has been described
by the former European Commission on Human Rights as one
“largely exercised inside an individual’s heart and mind.” 17 What is
important is that this internal aspect of the right is an absolute one—
no limitation, no restriction, no interference or control by the State.

13. See U.N. Human Rights Comm., International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, S. Treaty Doc. No. 95-20, 6 I.L.M. 368 (1967), 999 U.N.T.S. 171.
14. Nicolas Bratza, The Precious Asset: Freedom of Religion under the European
Convention on Human Rights, 14 ECCLESIASTICAL L. J. 256 (2012).
15. Id.
16. Kimlya v. Russia, App. No. 76836/01, 32782/03, ¶¶ 79–81, (Oct. 1, 2009 Eur.
Ct. H.R.).
17. DONNA GOMIEN, SHORT GUIDE TO THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN
RIGHTS 95 (3d ed. 2000).
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So this provision prohibits persecution of a person on the
grounds of his or her religion. In this respect, a very important
judgment of the Court is M.E. v. France of June 6, 2013. 18 The
Court was called upon to decide if the expulsion of a Christian Copt
to Egypt would expose him to inhuman or degrading treatment
contrary to Article 3 of the Convention. And the answer of the
Court, for the first time, was yes. This judgment sends today a
strong message to all European states that are faced with the
expulsion of a member of a religious community at risk and that are
confronted, in asylum seekers cases, with assessing the risk of
religious persecutions. 19 Nevertheless, the very fact that somebody
belongs to such a community is not enough; the risk of persecution
in the individual case, the case at hand, must be established on a
personal basis. Now what remains to be decided by the Court is the
exact or precise meaning of “religious persecutions.” 20
But Article 9 also forbids the use of physical threats or sanctions
to compel a person to deny, adhere to, or change his or her religion
or belief. It also prohibits any form of coercion sufficiently strong so
as to amount to indoctrination by the State.
This internal dimension has been held to go further and to
include a guarantee against a requirement to manifest or disclose the
nature of one’s religion. In the case of Sinan Isik v. Turkey of
February 2, 2010, the applicant’s complaint related to the reference
to religion in his identity card, a public document that was
frequently in use in daily life. 21 In the view of the Court, it was no
answer to the complaint that the space for religion in identity cards
could be left blank, since persons with identity cards not containing
information about religion would be distinguished against their
wishes and on the basis of interference by the public authorities from
those whose identity cards contained such an entry. A request for
such information not to be included was held by the Court to be
closely bound up with an individual’s most deeply held and private
conviction. 22
18. M.E. v. France, App. No. 50094/10 (June 6, 2013 Eur. Ct. H.R.).
19. Michael Kagan, Refugee Credibility Assessment and the “Religious Imposter” Problem,
43 VAND.J. TRANSNAT’L L. 1233 (2010).
20. Nicolas Hervieu, Une progression sans révolution dans l’appréhension européenne
des persécutions religieuses, Lettre “Actualités Droits-Libertés” du CREDOF (2013).
21. Sinan Isik v. Turkey, App. No. 21924/05 (Feb. 2, 2010, Eur. Ct. H.R.).
22. Wasmuth v. Germany, App. No. 12884/03 (Feb. 17, 2011 Eur. Ct. H.R.).
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Recently, the Court had to decide a very sensitive case
concerning the relation between freedom of religion and
discrimination, even if the applicant’s discrimination complaint on
the basis of religion was examined under Article 14 and Article 8 of
the Convention. As Lourdes Peroni rightly pointed out, “after
leaving aside the ‘freedom to resign’ doctrine in the Eweida and
Others v. the United Kingdom judgment of 15 January 2013, the
Court has just made another move towards greater recognition of
the importance of freedom of religion. In the Vojnity v. Hungary
judgment of 12 February 2013, the Court clearly recognizes religion
as a ‘suspect’ ground of differentiation. As a result—and just like
distinctions based on race, sex, and sexual orientation—states must
give ‘very weighty reasons’ if they wish to justify differences based on
religion.” 23 In this case, the applicant’s religious convictions were
decisive in the removal of his access rights to his children. Then—
and after asserting that only “very weighty reasons” could justify a
difference of treatment based on religion—the Court found that
there was actually no such reason in this case and concluded that the
applicant had been discriminated on the basis of his religious belief,
in his right to respect for family life. 24 In my view, the move is
certainly positive. It is hard to deny that religion has historically
worked as a category of discrimination and persecution, and it
therefore makes sense to apply heightened scrutiny to differences
based on this ground. 25
23. Lourdes Peroni, “Very Weighty Reasons” for Religion: Vojnity v. Hungary,
OBSERVERS
BLOG
(Feb.
27,
2013),
STRASBOURG
http://strasbourgobservers.com/2013/02/27/very-weighty-reasons-for-religion-vojnity-vhungary/.
24. Vojnity v. Hungary, § 38, App. No.29617/07 (Feb. 12, 2013 Eur. Ct. H.R.).
25. See the partly dissenting opinion of Judges Bratza, Hirvelä, and Nicolaou annexed
to Redfearn v. the United Kingdom, § 12, App. No. 47335/06 (2012 Eur. Ct. H.R.). See also
Kristin Henrard, Duties of Reasonable Accommodation in Relation to Religion and the European
Court of Human Rights: A Closer Look at the Prohibition of Discrimination, the Freedom of
Religion and Related Duties of State Neutrality, [hereinafter Duties of Reasonable
Accommodation], 5 ERASMUS L. REV. 71, 71–72 (2012). Henrard, however, observes: “The
supervisory practice of the Court is . . . rather ambivalent about the suspect nature of religion.”
Henrard, supra, at 71. See also Kristin Henrard, Libertad de religion y minorias religiosas: una
adaptacion adecuada de la diversidad religiosa? [Freedom of Religion and Religious Minorities:
an Adequate Accommodation of Religious Diversity?], in DERECHOS HUMANOS Y DIVERSIDAD
RELIGIOSA 247 (E.J. Ruiz Vieytez and G. Urrutia Asua eds., 2010). In the same direction, see
Federal Republic of Germany v. Y and Z, where the Court of Justice of the European Union
held that certain forms of serious interference with the public manifestation of religion may
constitute persecution for reasons of religion. Joined cases C-71/11 & C-99/11, (April 19,
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Moving now to the external dimension of freedom of religion,
the distinction between the holding of a religion and its
manifestation is a difficult one. As a matter of fact, the Court draws a
distinction between an act or practice that manifested a religion or
belief and one that is merely motivated by a religion. Nevertheless,
the approach could bring the Court dangerously close to deciding
whether a particular practice is formally required by a religion—a
task the judges are unable to decide given the relevant theological
issues.
The Court has been confronted with different aspects of the
manifestation of the freedom of religion: religious holidays; 26 ritual
slaughter; 27 refusal to perform duties; 28 religious symbols at work, 29
at school 30, and in public. 31
The Ahmet Arslan and Others v. Turkey judgment of February
23, 2010 concerned the criminal conviction (and prison sentence of
two to three months, commuted to a fine) of members of a religious
group for their dress code (turban, black tunic, and stick) in public
places (first outside a mosque in Ankara, then in the streets of the
city), pursuant to an act of 1935 prohibiting the wearing of religious
clothing except in places of worship and at religious ceremonies. 32
The Court found a violation of Article 9 of the Convention. This is
the first judgment concerning the wearing of religious clothing in
public space. This judgment is for me very important because
religious intolerance is a daily reality in Europe. How can minority

2012 E.C.R.).
26. Kosteski v. the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, App. No 55170/00 (April
13, 2006 Eur. Ct. H.R.).
27. Cha’are Shalom Ve Tsedek v. France, App. No 27417/95 (June 27, 2000 Eur. Ct.
H.R.).
28. Ladele and McFarlane v. the United Kingdom, App No. 51671/10, 36516/10
(Jan. 15, 2013 Eur. Ct. H.R.).
29. Eweida and Chaplin v. the United Kingdom, App. No. 48420/10, 59842/10 (Jan.
15, 2013 Eur. Ct. H.R.). See Megan Pearson, Article 9 at a Crossroads: Interference Before and
After Eweida, 13 HUM. RTS. L. REV. 580 (2013).
30. Leyla Sahin v. Turkey, App. No. 44774/98 (Nov. 10, 2005 Eur. Ct. H.R.).
31. Ahmet Arslan and Others v. Turkey, App. No. 41135/98 (Feb. 23, 2010 Eur Ct.
H.R.). Concerning diverging views among human rights bodies on this aspect, see Françoise
Tulkens and Sébastien Van Drooghenbroeck, The Domestic Courts’ Response to Divergent Views
among International Human Rights Bodies Thoughts Prompted by the Singh v. France Case in
LIBERAE COGITATIONES: LIBER AMICORUM MARC BOSSUYT 733 (André Alen, Veronique
Joosten, Riet Leysen, & William Verrijdt eds., 2013).
32. Ahmet Arslan v. Turkey, App. No. 41135/98 (Feb. 23, 2010, Eur. Ct. H.R.).
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religions be protected in public space in this context? Today, mainly
targeted at Muslims, attacks on religious pluralism focus on refusing
to share public space with the non-majority or only tolerating
practices seen as secular. 33
C. Collective Aspect
As rightly pointed out by Lech Garlicki, “[m]ost religions cannot
be exercised in a proper manner if the believers are deprived of the
possibility to act collectively. Thus, individual freedom of religion
cannot be guaranteed unless there is a collateral guarantee for the
freedom to found and to operate a church or other religious
community.” 34 So the Court has been faced, quite often recently and
under various forms, with this “collective aspect of religious
freedom.” In this area, as we will see, Article 9 and Article 11
(freedom of association) are interrelated.
“While religious freedom is primarily a matter of individual
conscience, it also implies, inter alia, freedom to ‘manifest [one’s]
religion’ alone and in private or in community with others, in public
and within the circle of those whose faith one shares. Bearing witness
in words and deeds is bound up with the existence of religious
convictions.” 35
Religious freedom has several important manifestations which
commit believers to exercise their rights in community with others,
very often within the framework of a religious organisation or
association. Freedom of religion as an individual right is discussed
typically as being a liberty interest or negative right, where the

33. On November 27, 2013, the Grand Chamber held a hearing in the case of S.A.S. v.
France concerning the ban on wearing the burqa and the niqab in the public space in France.
See Saïla Ouald Chaib, S.A.S. v. France: A Short Summary of an Interesting Hearing,
OBSERVERS
BLOG
(Nov.
29,
2013),
STRASBOURG
http://strasbourgobservers.com/2013/11/29/s-a-s-v-france-a-short-summary-of-aninteresting-hearing. The Grand Chamber delivered its judgment in the case on July 1, 2014;
the Court found no violation of Article 8 and no violation of Article 9 of the Convention on
the basis of margin of appreciation and proportionality. See, however, the joint dissenting
opinion of Judges Nussberger and Jäderblom annexed to the judgment.
34. Leszek Lech Garlicki, Collective Aspects of the Religious Freedoms: Recent
Developments in the Case Law of the European Court of Human Rights, in CENSORIAL
SENSITIVITIES: FREE SPEECH AND RELIGION IN A FUNDAMENTALIST WORLD 218, 218–19 (A.
Sajo ed. 2007).
35. Metropolitan Church of Bessarabia and Others v. Moldova, § 114, App. No.
45701/99 (Dec. 13, 2001 Eur. Ct. H.R.).
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primary obligation of the state is to leave individuals undisturbed in
the exercise of various aspects of religious freedom. When collective
aspects of religious freedom are in the focus of attention, European
scholars and lawyers instinctively turn to discuss the positive aspect of
the right, namely, the obligation of the state to entrench or promote
the enjoyment of religious freedom.
Pluralism is the main model of the Court’s case law related to
freedom of religion and the core principle which organizes churchstate relations. We see in the recent case law of the Court the
developments of the principle of pluralism going in two main
directions: no arbitrary State interferences, and State neutrality and
impartiality. 36
As Robin White and Clare Ovey rightly observe, “the pursuit of
multiculturalism and peaceful co-habitation of different religious
groups within society has frequently proved challenging. The history
of Europe is littered with examples of extreme religious intolerance
and, indeed, the European Convention on Human Rights was
conceived in the immediate aftermath of the persecution and
genocide of the adherents of one religion, Judaism, in the hope that
it would help to prevent such an atrocity ever taking place again. For
many believers, religious faith is central to their existence and their
most important defining characteristic. The Court is correct,
therefore, to stress in its case law the duty of the State as a guarantor
of pluralism and the fundamental nature of the rights to freedom of
belief and freedom to manifest religion.” 37
As summarized by Nicolas Bratza, “cases reflecting this vital
element of autonomy have tended to relate to state interference in
one of three key areas: the internal organisation of the religious
community, including the selection of its leaders; the grant or refusal
of official recognition to certain faiths in national law; and the
regulation by the state of places of worship. In each area the Court
has consistently stressed the need for state neutrality.” 38
Is there an obligation to protect against “dangerous religions”?
While most would agree with the Court’s view expressed in Serif v.
Greece that in circumstances of religious tension governments should
36. For further analysis, see Francoise Tulkens, The European Convention on Human
Rights and Church-State Relations: Pluralism vs. Pluralism, 30 CARDOZO L. REV. 2575
(2009).
37. See OVEY & WHITE, supra note 4, at 423–24.
38. Bratza, supra note 14, at 262.
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work to promote pluralism and “‘ensure tolerance between the rival
factions,’ it may frequently be the case that allowing one person
complete freedom to manifest his religion or belief would be to
impinge—sometimes with dangerous consequences—on the rights of
others. It would therefore perhaps be understandable if, in certain
cases, the Court were to allow a wide margin of appreciation to place
restrictions of the freedom to manifest religion or belief.” 39
However, some argue “that the Court has demonstrated a certain
lack of empathy for the believer, and has appeared only to pay lipservice to the commitment to religious freedom proclaimed . . . .” 40
Others are going further and submit that (especially) “when faced
with contestations touching upon the issue of expression of religion
in the public sphere,” the Court has adopted stances that are
questionable from the viewpoint of the principles it has itself
identified as central for religious freedom, first and foremost, the
protection of pluralism. 41 In the case law of the Court today, I also
observe that the main limitations to the right of religious freedom
(and also the freedom of thought or conscience) are motivated by
the need to protect democratic societies from the danger of Islam 42
and sects. 43
II. CONFLICTS OF RIGHTS
Here the sensitive question is the conflict (or potential conflict)
between freedom of religion and other rights, 44 in particular freedom
39. Serif v. Greece, App. No. 38178/97 (Dec. 14, 1999, Eur. Ct. H.R.). See also OVEY
& WHITE, supra note 4, at 423–24.
40. Serif, App. No. 38178/97.
41. Julie Ringelheim, Rights, Religion and the Public Sphere: the European Court of
Human Rights in Search of a Theory?, in LAW, STATE AND RELIGION IN THE NEW EUROPE:
DEBATES AND DILEMMAS 283 (Lorenzo Zucco & Camil Ungureanu eds., 2012).
42. Refah Partisi and Others v. Turkey, App. No. 41340/98, 41342/98, 41343/98,
41344/98 (Feb. 13, 2003 Eur. Ct. H.R.) (Grand Council Judgment).
43. Leela Förderkreis E.V. and Others v. Germany, App. No. 44774/98 (Nov. 6, 2008
Eur. Ct. H.R.).
44. See also, but on different aspects, Ian Leigh, Balancing Religious Autonomy and
other Human Rights under the European Convention, 1 OXFORD J. L. RELIG. 1 (2012);
Carolyn Evans & Anna Hood, Religious Autonomy and Labor Law: A Comparison of the
Jurisprudence of the United States and the European Court of Human Rights, 1 OXFORD J. OF
L. RELIG. 23 (2012); Lourdes Peroni, U.S. Supreme Court and ECHR: Conflicts Between
Religious Autonomy and Other Fundamental Rights, STRASBOURG OBSERVERS BLOG (Feb. 2,
2012),
http://strasbourgobservers.com/2012/02/02/u-s-supreme-court-and-ecthrconflicts-between-religious-autonomy-and-other-fundamental-rights/.
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of expression. How are these two rights, equally protected by the
Convention, to be reconciled? Even though the problem of conflicts
of law is a classic problem that has long preoccupied jurists and
philosophers, 45 such conflicts are becoming increasingly frequent in
many fields, as both the rights protected by the Convention and
states’ obligations have evolved. So how are we to judge, how should
we assess, these situations of conflict between fundamental rights? 46
The Court has, if I may say, the choice between different approaches,
each of them having potentialities and limits.
A. The Necessity Test
One of the most common ways of resolving conflicts of law is
suggested by the actual structure of certain provisions of the
Convention—the very ones which concern us here, Articles 9 and
10—which, on the one hand, recognise a right or a freedom and, on
the other hand, add that limitations are allowed on certain conditions.
So we are in the field of limitations on the rights secured, which
confronts us with the general problem that, in a democratic society,
hardly any rights are totally absolute. Moreover, these limitations or
restrictions illustrate the classic dialectic, where fundamental rights are
concerned, between safeguarding the individual right and defending
the general interest. For example, as regards Article 9, freedom to
manifest one’s religion or one’s religious beliefs is not an absolute
right. It may be set against the rights and freedoms of others, which
implies, inter alia, respect for everyone’s beliefs in relation to
proselytising 47 and protection of minors,48 or the protection of public
order, 49 security, 50 or public health. 51

45. See Robert Alexy, Balancing Constitutional Review and Representation, 3 INT’L J.
CONST. L. 572, 572–81 (2005); Steven Greer, Balancing and the European Court of Human
Rights: A Contribution to the Habermas-Alexy Debate, 63 CAMBRIDGE L. J., 412, 417 (2004).
46. Here I base myself mainly on Olivier De Schutter and Françoise Tulkens, Rights in
Conflict: The European Court of Human Rights as a Pragmatic Institution, in CONFLICTS
BETWEEN FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS 169 (Eva Brems ed., 2008).
47. Kokkinakis v. Greece, § 33, App. No. 14307/88 (May 25,1993 Eur. Ct. H.R.);
Larissis and Others v. Greece, App. No (February 24, 1998 Eur. Ct. H.R.).
48. Dahlab v. Switzerland, App. No. 42393/98 (Feb. 15, 2001 Eur. Ct. H.R.); Ciftci v.
Turkey, App. No. 71860/01 (June 17, 2004).
49. Vergos v. Greece, § 33, App. No. 65501/01 (June 24, 2004 Eur. Ct. H.R.),
(rational urban planning).
50. Phull v. France, § 21, App. No. 35753/03 (January 11, 2005 Eur. Ct. H.R.)
(wearing of the turban and security at airports).
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The method employed by the Court when called upon to judge
what are known as relatively protected rights is well known. It
proceeds in three stages: interference may be justified if it is
prescribed by law, pursues a legitimate aim, and is necessary in a
democratic society, which implies a pressing social need. The
combination of these three conditions opens the way to the
irresistible rise of the principle or criterion of proportionality. 52
One significant recent example: in the case of Giniewski v.
France, the applicant, a journalist, sociologist and historian, had
written a newspaper article on John-Paul II’s encyclical “The
splendour of truth.” 53 An association complained that the article was
defamatory of the Christian community, and the domestic courts
found that interference with freedom of expression was justified by
the need for “protection of the reputation or rights of others.” 54 In
its judgment of January 31, 2006, the Court observed that, although
the applicant’s article did indeed criticise a papal encyclical and thus
the position of the Pope, such an analysis could not be extended to
the whole of Christianity, which comprises various strands. It
considered above all that the applicant was seeking to develop an
argument about the scope of a specific doctrine and its possible links
with the origins of the Holocaust. In so doing he had made a
contribution, which by definition was open to discussion, to a wideranging and on-going debate, without sparking off any controversy
that was gratuitous or detached from the reality of contemporary
thought. By considering the detrimental effects of a particular
doctrine, the article in question contributed to a discussion of the
various possible reasons behind the extermination of the Jews in
Europe, a question of indisputable public interest in a democratic
society. The Court noted that the search for historical truth is an
integral part of freedom of expression and that the article written by
the applicant was in no way “gratuitously offensive” or insulting and
did not incite disrespect or hatred. 55 Consequently, the applicant’s

51. X. v. United Kingdom, App. No. 7992/77 (July 12, 1978 E. C. H. R) (obligation
on motor-cyclists to wear a helmet).
52. Paul Martens, L’irrésistible ascension du principe de proportionnalité, in PRESENCE
DU DROIT PUBLIC ET DES DROITS DE L’HOMME: MELANGES OFFERTS A JACQUES VELU 51
(1992).
53. Giniewski v. France, App. No. 64016/00 (Jan. 31, 2006, Eur. Ct. H.R.).
54. Id. at § 32; see also Eur. Conv. on H.R., art. 10, § 2.
55. Id. §§ 49–53.
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conviction on the charge of public defamation of the Christian
community did not meet a pressing social need
B. Balancing of Interests
Where two opposing provisions of one and the same
instrument—Articles 9 and 10 in this case—contradict each other,
the principle of proportionality is irrelevant. In this situation, the
Court takes a different approach—that of the balancing of interests—
to check whether the right balance has been struck between two
conflicting freedoms or rights. 56 Looking at it in another way, we are
no longer dealing with a freedom and the exceptions to it, but with
an interpretative dialectic that must seek to reconcile freedoms.
Where does the point of equilibrium lie between freedom of
expression and freedom of thought, conscience, and religion?
The I.A. v. Turkey judgment of September 13, 2005 concerned
the prosecution of the author of a novel, The Forbidden Phrases,
which contained “an abusive attack on the Prophet of Islam.” 57 The
Court observed that it was not disputed that the applicant’s
conviction had amounted to interference with his right to freedom
of expression. The interference had been prescribed by law and had
pursued the legitimate aims of preventing disorder and protecting
morals and the rights of others. As to deciding whether the
interference had been necessary, this involved weighing up the
conflicting interests relating to the exercise of two fundamental
freedoms, namely the applicant’s right to impart his ideas on
religion, on the one hand, and the right of others to respect for their
freedom of thought, conscience, and religion, on the other. Certain
passages in the novel in question had attacked the Prophet
Muhammad in an abusive manner. Therefore, the measure at issue
had been intended to provide protection against offensive attacks on
matters regarded as sacred by Muslims and could reasonably be
regarded as meeting a “pressing social need.” 58 In addition, the
authorities had not exceeded their margin of appreciation, and the
reasons given by the domestic courts to justify the measure taken

56. See François Rigaux, Logique et droits de l’homme in PROTECTING HUMAN RIGHTS:
THE EUROPEAN PERSPECTIVE, STUDIES IN MEMORY OF ROLV RYSSDAL 1197–1211 (Paul
Mahoney et al. ed., 2000).
57. I.A. v. Turkey, § 29, App No. 42571/09 (Dec. 13, 2005, Eur. Ct. H.R.).
58. Id. at § 30.
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against the applicant had been relevant and sufficient. As to whether
the conviction had been proportionate, the Court noted that the
national courts had not seized the book in question, and that the
small fine imposed appeared to be proportionate to the aims pursued
and accordingly found no violation.
There are those who believe that balancing interests is more a
matter of rhetoric than of method. What is the real meaning of this
balance metaphor? It is a question of weighing up rights in relation
one to another and giving priority to the one to which greater value
is attached. Three quite particular difficulties arise here. The first is
what we call incommensurability of rights. The very image of the
balance presupposes the existence of a common scale against which
the respective importance or the weight of different rights could be
measured, which is highly unrealistic. For example, finding the
balance between a Church’s freedom of religion and its followers’
freedom of expression “is more like judging whether a particular line
is longer than a particular rock is heavy.” 59 The second is that of
subjectivity. By using the metaphor of the balance, in fact one leaves
the court great freedom of judgment and this can have formidable
effects on judicial reasoning. 60
The third difficulty lies in the fact that the parties are not in
symmetrical positions and so the importance attributed to each of
their rights may depend on their relative positions. The OttoPreminger-Institut v. Austria judgment of September 24, 1994 is a
good example of this. The Austrian authorities objected to the
showing of a satirical film by a cinema club in Tyrol on the ground
that it ridiculed the Christian faith in general. Whereas it was a
private association that invoked freedom of expression, the freedom
of religion was that of all persons of the Catholic faith who might
feel offended by the images in the film that were considered
blasphemous. On the one hand we have a private individual, and on
the other a community of believers: the possibility cannot be ruled
out that the balance of rights was influenced, more or less
consciously, by the impression that an individual’s freedom of
expression had to be measured or weighed against the interests of all

59. Bendix Autolite Cort. v. Midwesco Enters., Inc., 486 U.S. 888, 897 (1988) (Scalia,
J., dissenting). See e.g., INCOMMENSURABILITY, INCOMPARABILITY AND PRACTICAL REASON
(Ruth Chang ed., 1997); BENOÎT FRYDMAN, LE SENS DES LOIS 436 (2005).
60. White v. Sweden, App. No. 42435/02 (September 19, 2006 Eur. Ct. H. R.).
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Catholics in the Austrian province of Tyrol. “The Court cannot
disregard the fact that the Roman Catholic religion is the religion of
the overwhelming majority of Tyroleans. In seizing the film, the
Austrian authorities acted to ensure religious peace in that region
and to prevent that some people should feel the object of attacks on
their religious beliefs in an unwarranted and offensive manner.” 61 In
fact, Roscoe Pound largely anticipated this danger as long ago as
1921 when he wrote: “When it comes to weighing or valuing claims
or demands, we must be careful to compare them on the same plane.
If we put one as an individual interest and the other as a social
interest, we may decide the question in advance of our very way of
putting it.” 62
C. The Choice of Priorities
As is emphasised by P. Ducoulombier, hierarchy is sometimes
taboo in legal thinking, either for philosophical reasons relating in
particular to the principle of indivisibility of fundamental human
rights or on more methodological or practical grounds, some people
thinking that such an approach is naive or pointless; 63 other writers

61. Otto-Preminger-Institut v. Austria, § 56, App. No. 13470/87 (September 24, 1994
Eur. Ct. H.R.). See also Wingrove v. the United Kingdom, App. No. 17419/90 (November
25, 1996 Eur. Ct. H.R), where the applicant complained of the British authorities’ refusal to
authorise the distribution, even limited to part of the public, of a video film containing erotic
scenes involving St Theresa of Avila and Christ. According to the authorities, the film should
be regarded as an insulting or offensive attack directed against the religious beliefs of Christians
and therefore constituted an offence against the blasphemy laws. The Court also considered
that the state could legitimately have limited the applicant’s freedom of expression in order to
protect the rights of others, in this case their right of religious freedom. Thus it extends its
interpretation of Article 9 by stating that this provision implies the right of believers to be
protected from provocative representations of objects of religious veneration. In this case the
applicant also stressed that the offence of blasphemy only covered attacks on the Christian
faith, and more specifically the Anglican faith, and argued that this offence should therefore be
seen as discriminatory. Here, however, the Court refrained from answering that argument,
merely pointing out that the degree of protection afforded by the law to other beliefs is not at
issue before the Court (§ 50). However, the reality is indeed the fact that the film in question
was an attack on the dominant religion. As François Rigaux observes, “it is not freedom of
religion but the power of a religion that is threatened.” See La liberté d’expression et ses limites,
Revue trimestrielle des droits de l’homme, 411 (1993).
62. Roscoe Pound, A Survey of Social Interest, 57 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1943).
63. PHILIPPE FRUMER, LA RENONCIATION AUX DROITS ET LIBERTES. LA CONVENTION
EUROPEENNE A L’EPREUVE DE LA VOLONTE INDIVIDUELLE (2001); Sébastien Van
Drooghenbroeck, L’horizontalisation des droits in LA RESPONSABILITE, FACE CACHEE DES
DROITS DE L’HOMME 381–82 (Hugues Dumont et al. eds., 2005).
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are in favour. 64 Personally, I do not think one can escape the need to
try and establish criteria by which this exercise might be guided. 65
For example, a distinction can be drawn between core rights,
those at the heart or centre, and those on the periphery. Freedom of
religion has an inner and an outer aspect. Its inner dimension—that
is to say, the right of everyone to have a religion and to change it, or
to have none at all—would be among the core rights. No limitation
or restriction could be placed on it, even if linked to freedom of
expression when, for example, the latter entails incitement to hate
speech, violence, or discrimination, on the basis of religious
allegiance.
The limits, or the difficulty, of this approach lie in the fact that,
over and above certain obvious factors (in particular inalienable
rights), it is no easy matter to identify the hard core. On the one
hand, doctrinal attempts to establish a hierarchy among the various
rights have to date largely failed. 66 On the other hand, the same is
true of attempts to identify exactly what the European Court regards
as the inviolable essence of each of the rights secured by the
Convention.
D. Practical Concordance
This approach based on practical concordance between
conflicting rights has been subjected to the most detailed theoretical
treatment, by the German constitutionalist K. Hesse, 67 and is to be

64. Dinah Shelton, Mettre En Balance Les Droits: Vers Une Hiérarchie Des Normes En
Droit International Des Droits De L’homme, in CLASSER LES DROITS DE L’HOMME 153
(Emmanuelle Bribosia & Ludovic Hennebel eds., 2004). See also Dinah Shelton, Normative
Hierarchy in International Law, 100 AM. J.INT’L L. 291 (2006); Dominique Breillat, La
hiérarchie des droits de l’homme, in DROIT ET POLITIQUE A LA CROISEE DES CULTURES:
MELANGES PHILIPPE ARDANT 353 (1999); Frederic Sudre, Droits intangibles et/ou droits
fondamentaux: y a-t-il des droits prééminents dans la Convention européenne des droits de
l’homme?, in LIBER AMICORUM MARC-ANDRE EISSEN 381 (1995); Olivier Jacot-Guillarmod,
Rapport entre démocratie et droits de l’homme, in DEMOCRATIE ET DROITS DE L’HOMME 49,
69 (1990) (referring to a material hierarchy constructed by European case law, via the concept
of democratic society); ELISABETH LAMBERT ABDELGAWAD, LES EFFETS DES ARRETS DE LA
COUR EUROPEENNE DES DROITS DE L’HOMME. CONTRIBUTION A UNE APPROCHE
PLURALISTE DU DROIT EUROPEEN DES DROITS DE L’HOMME 323 (1999).
65. See Donna J. Sullivan, Gender Equality and Religious Freedom: Toward a Framework
for Conflict Resolution, 24 N.Y.U J. INT’L. L. & POL. 795 (1992).
66. FRUMER, supra note 63, at 522–27.
67. See
KONRAD
HESSE,
GRUNDZÜGE DES VERFASSUNGSRECHTS DER
BUNDESREPUBLIK DEUTSCHLAND, nos. 71 et seq. (20th ed., 1995). On this practical
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seen in numerous decisions of the Bundesverfassungsgericht. The
starting-point for this approach is the outright refusal to move in the
direction of sacrificing one right to another. In other words, where
rights are in conflict, it is not appropriate to turn straightaway to the
balance in order to decide which right weighs heavier and deserves to
be upheld at the expense of all its competitors. On the contrary, the
aim should be, in an imaginative dialectical perspective involving
mutual concessions that attenuate contradictory requirements, to
delay the inexorable sacrifice until the last possible moment. The
novel character of this approach lies in the fact that it fosters
solutions that preserve the two conflicting rights to the maximum
rather than simply finding a point of balance between them.
An example of this is seen in the Öllinger v. Austria judgment of
June 29, 2006. The applicant notified the Salzburg Federal Police
Authority that on November 1, 1998, he would be holding a
meeting at the municipal cemetery in front of the war memorial in
memory of the Jews killed by the SS during the Second World War.
He stressed that the meeting would coincide with the gathering of
Comradeship IV (Kameradschaft IV) to commemorate the SS
soldiers killed during the Second World War. The Salzburg police
authority banned the meeting and the public security authority
dismissed the applicant’s appeal against that decision. Both the police
authority and the public security authority considered it necessary to
prohibit the meeting planned by the applicant in order to avoid any
disturbance to the commemorative meeting organised by
Comradeship IV, which was regarded as a popular ceremony for
which no authorisation was required. In these circumstances, the
Court was “not convinced by the Government’s argument that
allowing both meetings while taking preventive measures, such as
ensuring police presence in order to keep the two assemblies apart,
was not a viable alternative which would have preserved the
applicant’s right to freedom of assembly while at the same time
offering a sufficient degree of protection as regards the rights of the
cemetery’s visitors.” 68 In other words, the government presented the

concordance, see also FRIEDRICH MÜLLER, DISCOURS DE LA MÉTHODE JURIDIQUE 285–87
(O. Jouanjan trans. 1996), and SEBASTIEN VAN DROOGHENBROECK, LA PROPORTIONNALITE
DANS LE DROIT DE LA CONVENTION EUROPEENNE DES DROITS DE L’HOMME 212, 709–10
(2001).
68. Öllinger v. Austria, App. No.76900/01 (June 29, 2006 Eur. Ct. H.R.).
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conflict as necessary, whereas it could also be regarded as accidental
and as originating in the attitude of the authorities.
The limitation on the practical concordance approach is that it
lacks a constructive dimension: it does not include the need to try
and change the context in which the conflict arose. In other words,
it takes no account of the need to develop imaginative solutions in
order to limit the conflict itself and prevent it from arising again in
the future.
E. A Constructive Procedural Approach
This final approach operates in two stages. First of all, it takes
account of the fact that, in many situations, the conflict between
fundamental rights has its origin in the existence of a certain context
that creates the conditions for conflict. Conflicts appear inevitable as
long as these conditions are not taken into account and those that
can be changed are not identified. In concrete terms, the state must
explore all avenues that may enable the conflict to be overcome
before pleading that it is facing a dilemma—and perhaps also
recognize its responsibility in creating the context that gave rise to
the conflict.
In the area of concern to us here, the Otto-Preminger-Institut v.
Austria judgment of September 20, 1994 strikes me as a perfect
counter-example. In fact, all the conditions seemed to be present for
the persons likely to be offended by the works at issue not to be
exposed to them. The film was intended for showing in a film club
to a select audience, its subject had been announced in the
programme, and access was denied to minors under the age of
seventeen. So there was no reason for persons who might have been
offended to go to the club and see it. The Court states that the very
fact of advertising the screening of the film and the nature of it was a
sufficiently “public” expression to give offence. 69 Nevertheless, as P.
Wachsmann says, that analysis means that in the Court’s view the
offence lies “not in the fact of exposing them directly to images such
as to offend their faith, but in the mere fact of drawing their
attention to the existence of a work which they would consider
blasphemous,” and “ultimately turns against the association the

69. Otto-Preminger-Institut v. Austria, App. No. 13470/87, § 56 (Eur. Ct. H.R.
1994).
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legitimate precautions which it had taken to prevent anyone who
might feel his beliefs to be under attack from seeing the film.” 70
The same holds true of the Wingrove v. the United Kingdom
judgment of 25 November 1996. The possibility was open to the
authorities of limiting distribution of the video to licensed sex shops
or to persons above a certain age. 71 In the circumstances, one may
question the proportion of the measure chosen by the authorities,
that is to say, the total prohibition on the film’s distribution.
Then—this is the second stage—once every step has been taken
to avoid a conflict, procedures for settling it should be openly
debated. The important thing in this connection, to my way of
thinking, is not so much to apply predefined arithmetical formulae or
to invent architectural structures of some sort to guide judicial
reasoning, but to bring about the conditions for a debate in which
all interested parties without exception can express their views, so
that everyone’s interests can be taken into account and into
consideration in the discussion. This is precisely the free-ranging
discussion whose prerequisites were stated by Habermas in his
Ethique de la communication: “Everyone must be able to raise the
problem inherent in any statement, whatever it be; everyone must be
able to express his views, wishes and needs; no speaker should be
prevented by authoritarian pressure, whether from inside or outside
the discussion, from exercising his rights [of free discussion].” 72
Furthermore, such procedures offer the advantage of fostering an
on-going re-assessment of provisions, which might make it possible
for different rights to be reconciled. This question of reconciliation
of rights is to my mind essential, and I believe that open, public
debates on issues linked to religion and religious beliefs, in complete
objectivity and impartiality, can certainly assist it.

70. Patrick Wachsmann, La Religion Contre La Liberté D’expression: Sur Un Arrêt
Regrettable De La Cour Européenne Des Droits De L’homme, 12 REVUE UNIVERSELLE DES
DROITS DE L’HOMME 445, 445–46 (1994).
71. Wingrove v. the United Kingdom, App. No. 17419/90 (Eur. Ct. H.R. 1996).
72. Jürgen Habermas, Notes Programmatiques Pour Fonder En Raison Une Éthique De
La Discussion, in MORALE ET COMMUNICATION 110–11 (1986).
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CONCLUSION
As legal theorists have observed, “the law must be stable yet it
cannot stand still.” 73 Adaptation and modification have been
constant features of the Convention since 1950 and continue to be
so today. The Convention is now sixty years old and the Court’s case
law has been evolving for fifty years, alongside profound changes
that have occurred in Europe over recent decades. The Convention
has become a pan-European instrument of protection of human
rights and, in many countries, has made it possible to achieve a level
of respect for fundamental rights that would have been hardly
imaginable in 1950 when the Convention was drafted. It would
probably not have survived if it had not been regarded as a living
instrument that has to be interpreted in line with developments in
the society in which we live. The development of law is inseparable
from the development of society.
The European Court of Human Rights is the only Europeanlevel jurisdiction exclusively charged with adjudicating human rights
complaints. Could it be regarded as assuming the role of a
Constitutional Court of Europe? My answer is clearly no—but I will
not discuss this issue here. Nevertheless, as pointed out by Julie
Ringelheim, “analysis of the Court’s case law can shed an important
light on the debate on religion and European constitutionalism.” 74
Why? Because the role of the Court, as a supranational judicial body,
is to “define common standards on religious freedom in a religiously
diverse Europe,” 75 i.e., a Europe characterized by religious diversity.
It is a challenging task but indispensable for the protection of human
rights.
As observed by the former president of the Court, Nicolas
Bratza, “it is worth emphasising that there have always been two
challenges for the Court in protecting the rights guaranteed by
Article 9, which will not necessarily be felt by national courts charged
with the same task. First, it is readily apparent that the 47
Contracting States have very different religious and cultural
73. Attributed to Roscoe Pound in his book INTERPRETATIONS OF LEGAL HISTORY
(1923).
74. Ringelheim, supra note 41.
75. Id.
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backgrounds, and the Convention seeks to ensure that, as far as
possible, all such traditions are respected. Second, the Convention
does not endorse or indeed require any particular model of Churchstate relations. The Court must therefore strike a balance between,
on the one hand, the effective protection of individual rights and, on
the other, the need to respect very different constitutional traditions
among the Contracting States.” 76

76. Bratza, supra note 14, at 257–58.
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